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Deportation Law and the Social Interest
George Liviola, Jr.*
rUNDAMENTAL CIVIL AND HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS are being denied
to individuals in the United States because American courts
cling to stare decisis in denaturalization and deportation proceed-
ings. This article concerns itself with an examination of this pol-
icy, its history, progress, effect and possible reform.
Deportation is the removal of an alien to the country from
which he came;' denaturalization is the revocation of citizen-
ship.2 Authority for those actions rests with the legislative branch
of government; it never has been seriously questioned by United
States courts.3
Denaturalization and deportation have become the last re-
sort, the ultimate weapon of the legal process. When notorious
criminals have won their battles in the courtroom, the prosecu-
tion turns to more effective means of "getting" its man. 4 First
his citizenship is checked. If he is a citizen by naturalization
rather than by birth, his pre-naturalization record is examined
with great thoroughness. If some discrepancy is found in his
record or in the naturalization proceeding, then, according to the
letter of the law, he will be denaturalized. Following this, he is
subject to deportation proceedings.6 If he is in fact deported,
then the prosecution has finally won-through administrative
procedure.
* B.S. Kent State University; Court Assistant, Ashtabula County Child
Welfare Board; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of
Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 "In American Law-the removal or sending back of an alien to the coun-
try from which he came, the removal from the country of an alien consid-
ered inimical to the public welfare and without any punishment being im-
posed or contemplated." Black's Law Dict. 526 (4th ed. 1951).
2 "To confer citizenship upon an alien; to make a foreigner the same, in
respect to rights and privileges as if he were a native citizen or subject."
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.,
1931).
3 See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U. S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525, 96 L. Ed. 547 (1952).
4 See Murray, Red Scare, a Study in National Hysteria 1919-20(1955).
5 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 63 S. Ct. 1333, 87 L. Ed. 1796
(1943).
6 Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration 109 (1953).
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Deportation
Deportation became a part of the United States legal system
on June 25, 1798, with the passage of the Alien and Sedition
lawsJ It was expanded through a steady progression of further
severe measures.8 Finally, the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, popularly known as the McCarran-Walter Act, consoli-
dated all immigration and deportation laws into a single code. 9
Along with its much attacked quota restrictions, the Act deline-
ated the specific grounds for deportation of aliens. The classes of
deportable aliens have been broken down into eighteen separate
units, by one author,10 into four major groups by another.,-
After setting up the grounds for expulsion, the McCarran-
Walter Act rigidly predetermines what administrative discretion
the Attorney General will have in executing these laws. If an
alien's acts fill any of eleven categories, the Attorney General is
bound to deport him and is not allowed to exercise any discre-
tion.1 2 When the Attorney General does have authorization to
suspend deportation, Congress must approve of the Attorney
General's recommendation.' 3 Once deportation is final the alien
is not allowed to re-enter the United States. 4 The most severe
feature of the Act is its retroactive application. 15 With the Su-
preme Court's backing, the law has erased the immunity pre-
viously granted by the statutes of limitation.'"
Human Rights Verboten
Deportation and denaturalization procedures are not to be
interpreted as criminal proceedings; they are civil in nature and
therefore the constitutional limitations guaranteed in criminal
7 Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570. Also see Miller, Crisis in Freedom, The
Alien and Sedition Acts (1951), and Volney, The United States From Wil-
derness to World Power 178 (1953).
8 Act of October 19, 1888, 25 Stat. 566; § 1, Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat.
1084; Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874; Act of October 16, 1918, 40 Stat.
1012; Act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 670; Act of September 23, 1950, 64 Stat.
987.
9 Publ. L. 414, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
10 Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure (1959).
1 Maslow, Recasting Our Immigration Policy, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (1956).
12 Supra n. 9.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 74 S. Ct. 737, 98 L. Ed. 911 (1954).
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DEPORTATION LAW
cases cannot be applied to them.17 Congress has expressly denied
the enforcement of deportation statutes by the courts; it has as-
signed this duty to administrative officials within particular de-
partments. 18 The courts have, with few exceptions, held that the
power of deportation and denaturalization is an exclusive ex-
pression of sovereignty? 9
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the court affirmed the
sovereignty theory.20 Fong Yue Ting was a Chinese national who
came to the United States in 1879 and lived continuously in the
United States until 1893. On May 5, 1892, Congress passed a law
which required all foreign persons who did not have proof of
lawful residence in the United States to procure a certificate of
residence from the Collector of Internal Revenue. Fong's appli-
cation for such certificate was refused because his witnesses were
persons of the Chinese race and therefore not deemed creditable.
However, they were the only persons who could truthfully swear
that Fong was lawfully in the Country on May 5, 1892. In accord-
ance with the statute, Fong was brought before a federal judge
who ordered him deported since he could produce no suitable
witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding
that Fong had no constitutional rights since he was a foreign
national who could not prove lawful residence in the Country.21
The Court added that deportation was not a punishment but sim-
ply a device for the maintenance of national sovereignty.22 Jus-
tice Brewer, in his dissent, reasoned that deportation involves
"arrest, deprivation of liberty, removal from home, family, busi-
ness, property." 23 Justice Field, also dissenting, said, "The pun-
17 See, for a well reasoned and historical approach to this problem, Nava-
sky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. of Kan. City Rev. (1959).
18 Gordon and Rosenfield, op. cit. supra n. 10 at 513.
19 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 S. Ct. 671,
53 L. Ed. 1013 (1908); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 33 S. Ct. 607, 57
L. Ed. 978 (1913); Belokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed.
221 (1923). Recently the Court modified this stand in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U. S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 630 (1958) and in Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp.
683 (D. C. Cir. 1960). More recently, however, the Court distinguished its
modifications made in Trop v. Dulles and appears to have reinstated the
sovereignty theory in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1435,
8 S. Ct. 1376 (1960) and in U. S. v. Esperdy, 375 U. S. 10, 84 S. Ct. 66, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 47 (1963).
20 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed.
905 (1893).
21 Id. at 731.
22 Id. at 707.
23 Id. at 739.
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ishment is beyond all reason in its severity. It is cruel and un-
usual." 24 However the majority's ruling on punishment remains
the law today.
From this initial line the courts moved to deny the rights to
trial by jury,25 to freedom of speech and assembly,2 6 the freedoms
from cruel and unusual punishments,27 ex post facto laws,28 and
bills of attainder. 29 Today, there appears a trend towards liberal-
ization of deportation and denaturalization policies,30 but the po-
tential for abuse of power and with it the threat to human rights
remains. One need only look back to the hysteria of 1919-20 to
realize that administrative "guarantees" mean nothing when
power is available to those who would abuse it.3 1 For instance,
the Alien Registration Act of 1940 made violations of the nar-
cotics laws of the United States a deportable offense, but spe-
cifically excepted convictions prior to the passage of the Act. 32
The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 specifically stated that an
alien could be deported if he had been convicted at any time
after entry of violating any law dealing with illicit traffic in
narcotics. 3
3
Carlos Marcello, an alien who had come to the United States
in 1910 at the age of eight months and had lived here continu-
ously until his deportation hearing in 1955, could not claim that
he had a right to be protected against an ex post facto law.34 To
illustrate the abuse of power that took place in this deportation
hearing, the local newspapers carried front page stories quoting
official sources in the Attorney General's office as stating that the
"cpetitioner was an undesirable citizen for whose deportation the
proceedings were 'specially designed' and that he was engaged in
large scale slot machine operations and other gambling activities
24 Id. at 759.
25 Galvan v. Press, supra, n. 16.
26 Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 24 S. Ct. 719, 48 L. Ed. 979 (1904).
27 Polites v. Sahli, 302 F. 2d 449 (6th Cir. 1962).
28 Tehmann v. Carson, 353 U. S. 685, 77 S. Ct. 1022, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1122 (1957).
29 Quattrone v. Nicolls, 210 F. 2d 513 (1st Cir. 1954).
80 See Gordon and Rosenfield, op. cit. supra, at 539, for a very thorough
study of deportation proceedings.
31 See, Dunn, The Palmer Raids (1948) and Wickersham, Report on the
Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States (1931).
32 Act of June 28, 1940, supra, n. 8.
83 Publ. L. 414, supra, n. 9.
34 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757, 99 L. Ed. 1107 (1955).
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in Louisiana." 35 The papers also quoted the source as saying
that "the action was another step in the Attorney General's pro-
gram of denaturalization and/or deportation of undesirable per-
sons of foreign birth who are engaged in racketeering or other
criminal activities." 3 The facts show that Marcello was never
convicted of any of the gambling or racketeering activities that
he was supposed to be involved in.
In this case, Justice Douglas, dissenting, disputed the logic
of the majority of the court in their acceptance of the ex post
facto provision of the McCarran Act.
I find nothing in the constitution exempting aliens from the
operations of ex post facto laws . .. The conclusion is in-
escapable that the act merely adds a new punishment for a
past offense.37
Denaturalization
Denaturalization first became a part of American law in 1865
when the increasing numbers of Civil War deserters called for
severe measures. The law forfeited the citizenship of both for-
eign born and native who deserted the military service of the
United States. 38 Forty-one years later, another denaturalization
law was passed which affected only naturalized citizens. 39 Can-
cellation of citizenship certificates was made permissible if they
were "illegally procured" or obtained by fraud.40 This Act of
1906 was based upon the idea that fraud-gained citizenship was
void ab initio.41 The Supreme Court in Johannessen v. United
States ruled that though the 1906 Act was passed fourteen years
after Johannessen's naturalization, the ex post facto clause of the
constitution was not applicable to him because he had obtained
his citizenship by the perjury of two witnesses. 42 The Court rea-
soned that the naturalization was an ex parte one and that the
naturalization order was not to be given conclusive effect as
35 Id. at 315.
36 Id. at 316.
37 Id. at 319-320.
38 13 Stat. 490 (1865).
39 Nationality Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 601.
40 Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 117 (1946).
41 Id. at 116 ff.
42 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 32 S. Ct. 613, 56 L. Ed. 1066
(1912).
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against the public.43 It compared the certificate of naturalization
to a public grant of land or a patent for an invention-all three
revocable for fraud.44 The Court explained that the ex post facto
aspect was beyond consideration because denaturalization is no
punishment but a deprivation of an "ill gotten privilege." 45
These decisions emphasize that a denaturalization suit is pre-
dominantly civil in nature.46 Service of process must be made as
in any other civil action and the one upon whom process is made
is not subject to arrest or imprisonment.47 The defendant is not
entitled to a jury trial or to any benefit that a criminal statute
of limitations might give him.48 It has been argued that de-
naturalization is not a penalty but only the correction of an error
in the original proceeding. 49 Another and more effective argu-
ment has been that a denaturalization is only a cancellation of a
citizenship to which the alien was never lawfully entitled. 50 Re-
cently, however, the Supreme Court has determined that a de-
naturalization proceeding is a hybrid between a criminal and a
civil action. In Brown v. United States, the court affirmed the
contempt conviction of the defendant who, testifying in her own
behalf refused to answer questions on her membership in the
Communist Party.5 1 Since the Court likened the denaturalization
hearing to a criminal case, the defendant was denied protection
against self-incrimination after initial waiver which she would
have had, if the action had been considered civil. 52 Justice Black,
dissenting, said that the defendant in a denaturalization pro-
ceeding has no way of knowing whether the proceeding will be
treated as criminal or civil.53
Frank Costello had denaturalization proceedings presented
against him in 1956. 5 4 After a dismissal on a technicality, he was
43 Id. at 241.
44 Id. at 239.
45 Id. at 242.
46 Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654, 66 S. Ct. 1304, 90 L. Ed. 1500
(1946).
47 Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101 (1913).
48 United States v. Mansour, 170 F. 671 (S. D. N. Y. 1908).
49 Sourino v. United States, 86 F. 2d 309 (5th Cir. 1936).
50 Luria v. United States, supra n. 47.
51 Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 78 S. Ct. 622, 2 L. Ed. 589 (1958).
52 Id. at 157.
53 Id. at 159.
54 United States v. Costello, 145 F. Supp. 892 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1956).
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finally denaturalized in the Federal District Court of New York
on the ground that he had procured a certificate of naturalization
by wilful misrepresentation and fraud.55 The United States Court
of Appeals56 and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision.5 7
Costello had become naturalized thirty-one years before the
hearing. Denaturalization hinged on a technicality in the natu-
ralization printed form. Costello had listed "real estate" as his
occupation, which, in part, it was, although his major source of
income was "bootlegging." In their dissenting opinion, Justices
Douglas and Black pointed out:
The forms of naturalization in use at the time did not ask
for disclosure of all business activities of an appellant of all
sources of income . . . The fact that this real estate business
was secondary in petitioner's regime did not make it any the
less his 'occupation.' Petitioner answered truthfully when
he listed 'real estate' as his 'occupation.' 5s
A sovereign nation surely must be able to control the quan-
tity and quality of its immigrants. Still, the deportation of long-
time residents or naturalized citizens violates fundamental jus-
tice. In most instances these men and women have spent the
greater part of their lives in this country.5 9 Only by the accident
of birth can they be distinguished from other Americans. Their
ties to the countries of their birth are for the most part purely
sentimental, and they may have little, if any, knowledge of their
history, culture, civilization, or way of life. From the sociological
standpoint, the American environment is as decisive in the crea-
tion of their personalities as in the environment of whatever for-
eign country served as their birthplace. 60 To ignore the role of
cultural environment in the molding of criminals and undesir-
ables is to deny all the contributing forces which sociologists,
psychiatrists and historians have long recognized to exist.6'
The Evil Created by These Laws
The hunting down and singling out of long-time residents or
naturalized citizens forces these people to live under a constant
55 United States v. Costello, 247 F. 2d 384 (2d Cir., 1957).
56 United States v. Costello, 171 F. Supp. 10 (S. D. N. Y. 1959).
57 Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265, 81 S. Ct. 534, 5 L. Ed. 551 (1961).
58 Id. at 288-289.
59 See Konvitz, supra n. 6 at 112.
60 Cavan, Criminology 701 (2d ed. 1955).
61 Id. at 677-706.
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threat of retroactive and ex post facto laws that undermines the
security on which they rely. They come to realize that, if they
are naturalized, their citizenship is only of second or third class,
subject to the scrutiny of anyone who would wish them harm.
They must be careful in what they say and how they say it,62
knowing that they expose themselves to revocation of citizenship
for technicalities that occurred possibly half a century before.
Yet, under the constitution, there is but one distinction between
native and naturalized citizens: their eligibility for the office of
President of the United States.63 Native citizens are not de-
naturalized and deported for their crimes; why then should nat-
uralized citizens be so treated? The history of our country is re-
plete with fine deeds of naturalized citizens and with the war
sacrifices of immigrants and their sons. No laws are justified
which reduce the certificate of naturalization to the status of a
visitor's card.
Another effect of indiscriminate deportation is the hardship
wrought in particular cases. Often, it is the family who suffers
more than the deportee.64 Children are uprooted from the land
of their birth so that they may follow their deported parent.6 5
In this day of televised congressional hearings, though we
are now three or four generations removed from the great immi-
gration waves, each publicized deportation fans prejudice against
nationality groups. This has a divisive effect effect upon our na-
tional entity. The costs of disunity cannot be balanced by the
potential benefits we may receive by getting rid of undesirable
persons. The American penal system should be adequate to pro-
tect society against them. The search for substitutes is an ad-
mission of inadequacy.
Perhaps the most far reaching effect of American denatural-
ization and deportation policy is its impact on our foreign rela-
tions. It is an insult to a sovereign country to return an indi-
vidual who was born there but has spent the greatest part of his
life in the deporting country. Perhaps this feeling is best ex-
pressed in the alleged remark of an Italian official:
We do not want another Lucky Luciano. He lived in Italy
a short time and then spent most of his time in the United
62 Schneiderman v. United States, supra n. 5.
63 The Constitution of the United States, Art. 2.
64 Ex Parte Sentner, 94 F. Supp. 77 (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1950).
65 Coleman v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512, 96 L. Ed. 586 (1952).
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States ... It's not blood that makes a man delinquent; it's
society...6G
The enmity that grew between Japan and the United States
over the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 is too well remembered
to perpetuate a xenophobic deportation and denaturalization
policy.6 7
Reform
The key to a reform of these policies is to recognize that
deportation is in fact criminal punishment.6 8 Every man who
maintains his home for twenty, thirty or forty years, suffers dep-
rivation and anguish, more severe than prison, by deportation.69
Civil rights must be guaranteed to prospective deportees as they
are to all other accused persons.70 As long as the prosecutor can
work in the penumbra of a hearing without civil rights, a fun-
damental inequity will exist. Civil rights laws were written to
prevent exactly what happens in these administrative hearings. 7'
The courts have refused to digress from the policy set by Con-
gress. It is, therefore, Congress which has the task of making
American civil rights available for all who live within the
American frontiers. 72
It will also be necessary to place a statute of limitations upon
the McCarran Act. The Constitution recognizes naturalization as
an absolute right; yet, the McCarran Act turns it into a self-
renewing visitation right subject to cancellation. A statute of
limitations would help to blunt the force of the injustice that
stems from this law.73 It would be more fair to abolish deporta-
tion for those who have been accepted as bona fide residents or
naturalized citizens; to place conditions upon naturalized citizen-
ship renders that citizenship second class.74 We may not be ready
66 New York Times, January 2, 1953, p. 3.
67 Mayer & Forster, The United States and the Twentieth Century 362
(1958).
68 See Navasky, supra n. 17.
69 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 73 S. Ct. 625,
97 L. Ed. 956 (1953).
70 Navasky, op. cit. supra n. 17.
71 Maslow, op. cit. supra n. 11.
72 Navasky, op. cit. supra n. 17.
73 See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 73 S. Ct. 603, 97 L. Ed. 972 (1953).
74 II Carman, Syreet and Wishy, The History of the American People 797
(2d ed. 1961).
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yet for such a sweeping reform, but as a starter a statute of
limitations is needed.75
At the same time there should be a closer screening of appli-
cants for entry and citizenship. A thorough investigation of the
immigrant's life, background, family relationships and court rec-
ords prior to entry would eliminate the fears that dictate the
expulsion of foreigners who fail to "assimilate."
75 Unique among the Anglo-Saxon nations, Australia, in the Citizenship Act
of 1958, placed a 10 year statute of limitations on revocation of naturaliza-
tion for any cause including fraud in the procurement. See Parry, Na-
tionality and Citizenship Laws of the Commonwealth and the Republic of
Ireland 1134 (1960).
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